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ABSTRACT
The EU and the US are involved currently in discussions of what is called 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Up to now, there 
have been several attempts to assess the economic impact of the TTIP, both 
at the EU-wide level and for some of the EU countries. None of these studies, 
however, pays any attention to the potential impact of the TTIP on every EU 
country, which is the main aim of this paper. In a nutshell, the main ﬁndings 
indicate that the effects of the TTIP agreement are going to be small, albeit 
positive, and not equally distributed. More speciﬁcally, the most developed 
countries tend to be those that, potentially, will undergo a higher increase in 
their trade with the US, so they are more likely to reap beneﬁts from the TTIP 
than the less developed countries. This being so, the TTIP will (weakly) increase 
cross-country disparities.
Keywords: TTIP; Trade; EU Countries; Cross-country Disparities. 
RESUMEN
La UE y Estados Unidos están embarcados en conversaciones sobre lo que 
se llama el “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)”. Ha habido, 
hasta ahora, varios intentos de evaluar el impacto económico del TTIP, tanto a 
nivel europeo como para algún país en particular. Ninguno de estos estudios, 
sin embargo, presta atención al impacto del TTIP sobre cada país europeo, 
principal objetivo de este trabajo. De forma resumida, los principales resulta-
dos indican que los efectos del TTIP van a ser positivos aunque reducidos, y no 
van a estar distribuidos de forma equitativa. De forma más precisa, los países 
más desarrollados tienden a ser los que, potencialmente, experimentarán un 
mayor incremento en el comercio con Estados Unidos, por lo que resultarán 
más beneﬁciados que los países menos desarrollados. Siendo esto así, el TTIP 
incrementará (débilmente) las disparidades entre países.
Palabras clave: TTIP; Comercio; Países de la UE; Disparidades entre países; 
JEL classiﬁcation: F14, F62, R11.
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHY A TTIP AGREEMENT? 1
The EU and the US are currently involved in the discussion of what is called 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).2 Although its spe-
ciﬁcs are not yet well deﬁned, the TTIP is meant as a free trade agreement 
between both parties. As with any free trade agreement, its essence lies in the 
reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment, while its at-
tractiveness is linked to the potential positive effects of trade and investment 
on economic welfare.3
But, why a TTIP agreement between the EU and the US? There are, in prin-
ciple, two closely related reasons. First, the EU-US trade is the largest bilateral 
trade in the world (Erixon and Bauer, 2010). Taken together, the EU and the US 
represent nearly 45% of world trade.4 Second, the trade links between them 
are very strong. The US is, excluding intra-EU trade and according to 2014 
data, the most important trade partner of the EU, accounting for 17.5% of 
extra-EU exports and 11.7% of extra-EU imports. From the point of view of 
the US, the EU is also a very relevant partner, as it is the destination of around 
17% of both exports and imports. 
The intensity of the trade relations between the EU and the US is, prob-
ably, the main structural feature behind the TTIP. The economic rationale for 
this agreement is, however, intensiﬁed by three other developments: ﬁrst, by 
the urgent need to boost the rate of economic growth (both in the EU and in 
the US) after the 2008 crisis; second, by the failure of the Doha round of mul-
tilateral trade talks; and third, by the necessity for both parties to regain some 
of the competitive advantages lost to the emerging economies (Felbermayr 
and Larch, 2013; Hayes, 2015). To a higher or lower extent, depending on the 
perspective adopted, it is thought that an improvement in the three aforemen-
tioned developments could potentially be achieved through the implementa-
1 This paper is based on a report (devoted to the situation of European (Spanish) regions rather than 
European countries) originally prepared for SIEPS (Villaverde and Maza, 2015a). The authors thank 
SIEPS for funding this collaboration. The authors also thank two anonymous referees for their useful 
comments and suggestions.
2 The US has just reach an agreement with another eleven Paciﬁc Rim countries about what is known 
as the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP). This agreement is, up to now, the most important commercial 
agreement in the economic history of the world.
3 Here, however, we give attention solely to the trade side of the agreement. For an analysis of FDI 
devoted to the European regions, see e.g. (Villaverde and Maza, 2015b; Maza and Villaverde, 2015)
4 It is important to note that this ﬁgure includes intra-EU trade. 
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tion of the TTIP agreement.5 
Regarding this issue, there is a vast literature that analyses, from a theoreti-
cal point of view, the potential impacts of free trade agreements (Plummer et 
al., 2010). It points out that this type of agreements has both static and dy-
namic effects, which can be instrumental for countries joining the agreement. 
From an empirical perspective, papers addressing this issue use ex-ante and/
or ex-post methods. For the speciﬁc case of the TTIP, however, there are only 
some ex-ante evaluations, all of them based, to the best of out knowledge, on 
general equilibrium models.6 All these works take, as a case study, the EU as a 
whole or just some of the EU countries, but none of them examines the issue 
from the point of view of all EU individual countries.
Taking these considerations into account, the aim of this paper is to provide 
some empirical preliminary evidence on the likely impact of the implementa-
tion of the TTIP for every EU country. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
ﬁrst paper dealing with this issue. More speciﬁcally, this paper tries to answer 
the following questions: What will be, in principle, the effects of the TTIP on 
every EU country? Will they be quite remarkable? Will they be equally distrib-
uted? To answer these questions, and taking data mainly from the Datacomex 
(http://datacomex.comercio.es/) and Comtrade (http://comtrade.un.org/) data-
banks, we will carry out an ex-ante evaluation for the period 2000-2014 based 
on trade indicators. This is due to the fact that a general equilibrium model 
requires much more information and this is scant for many countries. Because 
of this, a word of caution seems to be mandatory: Due to the methodological 
approach of the paper the conclusions drawn should be considered as very 
preliminary and not representative of pure causality.
So, bearing in mind the preliminary nature of this study, we can state the 
results reveal that the effects of the TTIP will be rather limited and not equally 
distributed across EU member states. We also ﬁnd that he most beneﬁted 
countries will be the most developed ones.
The paper is structured as follows. First, a brief review of EU-US trade rela-
tions is conducted. Next, the controversy about the impact of the TTIP at the 
European-wide level is reviewed. Afterwards, an ex-ante analysis of the poten-
tial directions7 of TTIP effects on the EU countries is carried out. Finally, some 
concluding remarks are offered.
5 In a nutshell, it is thought that the TTIP agreement will help to increase the volume of trade among 
the partners, and therefore, their economic welfare (Lloyd and Maclaren, 2004). Namely, it will 
“contribute to the development of global rules that can strengthen the multilateral trading system” 
(Schott and Cimino, 2013:1), and will give an important boost to the role played by the EU and the 
US in the world.
6 These studies are summarised in Section 3.
7 All papers addressing the potential impact of the TTIP point out that the qualitative results (direction 
of changes) given by them are much more reliable than the quantitative ones. 
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2. EU-US TRADE RELATIONS
In order to get an idea of the relevance of the potential economic gains 
from the TTIP, we agree with Erixon and Bauer (2010) that there are at least 
three aspects that should be taken into consideration (Figure 1). The ﬁrst one 
relates to size, and this is that size matters. Because we are referring to two of 
the largest economies in the world (taken together, they account, on average 
for the period 2000-2014, for 53.7% of world GDP), it is expected that the 
effects of the TTIP agreement will be bigger than those of similar agreements 
between smaller economies: therefore, the interest in unveiling its potential 
economic consequences. The importance of size is not only related to the 
share of the two parties in their respective GDP, but also, as previously men-
tioned, in world trade; this share is also very high, as it represents, once again 
on average for the period 2000-2014, 45.7 and 51.3% of, respectively, global 
exports and imports.8 
FIGURE 1. SHARE (%) OF EU & US ON WORLD TOTAL
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) and own elaboration.
The second feature relates to the amount of the bilateral trade between 
the two parties. As mentioned before, EU-US trade is one of the largest bilat-
eral trade relationships in the world. This being the case, it is also true that, in 
8 If the intra-EU trade were excluded, the EU-US trade would account for about a third of world trade. 
It is also convenient to say, although it is out of the scope of the paper, that the importance of EU-US 
is even higher from the point of view of FDI; when taken together, the inward FDI in the EU and the US 
represents around 60% of the world FDI, while the outward FDI is around 70%.
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2000, the share of this bilateral trade was much larger than in 2014 (Figure 
2). In addition, its evolution presents a rather stable declining pattern over 
time, most probably linked to the increase in the role played by the emerging 
economies in global trade. There is no doubt that this is one of the main rea-
sons behind the TTIP.
The third aspect that should be considered refers to the composition of 
trade between the EU and the US. Although at a highly aggregated level, Figure 
3 shows that the trade proﬁle is very similar, as should be expected consider-
ing the high level of development of both parties. As can be seen, equipment 
goods, intermediate manufactured goods, consumer products and automo-
biles are the most important sectors. In any case, it is noteworthy that the 
grouping in Figure 3 masks the relevance of some industries playing a crucial 
role in EU-US trade; among them, medicaments, organic chemicals, electrical 
machinery and apparatus, precision instrument manufactures, industrial ma-
chinery, road motor vehicles, petroleum products, and aircraft and associated 
equipment stand out.
FIGURE 2. EU-US BILATERAL MERCHANDISE TRADE (% OF TOTAL EXCLUDING INTRA-EU TRADE)
Source: Datacomex, Comtrade and own elaboration.
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FIGURE 3. COMPOSITION OF BILATERAL MERCHANDISE TRADE (PERIOD 2000-2014) 
Note: 1. Food, beverages and tobacco; 2. Energy products; 3. Primary materials; 4. Intermediate 
manufactured goods; 5. Equipment goods; 6. Automobile sector; 7. Durable consumer products; 8. 
Consumer products; 9. Other goods.
Source: Datacomex and own elaboration.
3. THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE ASSESSMENTS OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE TTIP9
As is well known, a free trade area is an agreement between two or more 
economies that implies the reduction/elimination of tariffs, as well as quantita-
tive restrictions and preferences on most (if not all) goods and services traded 
between them. At the same time, these economies keep their own trade re-
gime to the rest of the world. A free trade area can cause both positive and 
negative effects through, respectively, trade creation and trade deviation, the 
ﬁnal result, from a welfare point of view, depending (for each member country 
of the area and for the rest of the world) on the relative strength of these two 
effects. The ﬁnal economic impact of a free trade area remains, therefore, an 
empirical issue.
From this empirical perspective, there are both ex-ante and ex-post meth-
ods to try to evaluate the impact of free trade agreements (Plummer et al. 
2010). Regarding the ex-ante evaluation, i.e. the potential impact, there are 
three main approaches: two of them, namely the use of trade indicators and 
the estimation of computable general equilibrium models, focus on the effects 
at the macro level, while the other, based on the estimation of the so-called 
9 Although the criticism of the TTIP stems from different angles, and some of them are even shown 
in the streets and public places, here we give attention only to the economic perspective. For a 
mostly political and very critical review of the TTIP, see Hilary (2014). For an incisive analysis of costs 
and beneﬁts, see De Ville and Siles-Brugge (2015). It is also interesting to note that the recent TPP 
agreement is facing similar criticism to those of the TTIP.
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SMART model,10 focuses on the impacts at the industry level. As for the ex-
post evaluation, i.e. the actual impact, the use of gravity models is the most 
common approach.
Because we are still in the initial stages of creating a free trade area be-
tween the EU and the US, and the TTIP has not yet been approved and imple-
mented, the various analyses of its impact that have been carried out are, out 
of necessity, ex-ante evaluations. According to Raza et al. (2014), four major 
reports have been produced: Berden et al. (2009) for ECORYS, Fontagné et al. 
(2013) for CEPII, Francois et al. (2013) for CEPR, and Felbermayr et al. (2013a) 
for Bertelsmann/Ifo. Interestingly enough, all four of these reports apply, ba-
sically, the same methodology, namely different versions of a rather similar 
general equilibrium model.
The assessments in these four reports proceed via a simple mechanism: 
price changes. The idea behind them is that the removal of trade barriers 
brings about a reduction of trade costs, and therefore, a decrease in input 
costs, production costs and domestic prices, with the corresponding productiv-
ity gains (through enabling further specialisation and exploitation of scale eco-
nomics) and mark-up reductions. This implies higher output, higher incomes, 
and higher real wages. More speciﬁcally, the main ﬁndings and assumptions 
of the four abovementioned reports, which should be “best understood as a 
ballpark indication of the economic effects rather than precise predictions of 
exactly what will happen” (European Commission, 2013:3), are as indicated in 
Table 1. 
Generally speaking, the conclusion is that the impact of the TTIP agree-
ment on the EU –the bulk of it (around 80% of the total) stemming from low-
ered non-tariff barriers–11 is positive and non-negligible, but rather limited and 
very distributed over time. As stated by Raza et al. (2014:4), the changes are 
long-term, that is, they “will accrue only over a transition period of 10 to 20 
years”. Even so, these results are mostly considered to be a bit overoptimistic, 
as they are based on some assumptions that are not fully realistic –e.g. the 
CEPII and CPR studies consider free labour and capital mobility (full employ-
ment) – and are obtained without paying due attention to either (macro and 
social) costs (Dieter, 2014) or negative third-country effects.12 Put another way, 
it is generally expected that the positive effects of static and dynamic trade 
creation will outweigh the corresponding negative effects of static and dynamic 
trade diversion, but most probably, only by a small margin.
10 Contrary to the other models, the SMART (Software for Market Analysis and Restrictions on Trade) 
is a partial equilibrium model, in that it focuses on just a single good.
11 This is because the current level of tariffs on bilateral trade is very low: on average, around 2.2% 
and 3.3% in the US and the EU, respectively (Fontagné et al., 2013).
12 To a certain extent, the controversy about the size and distribution of the TTIP’s impact arises 
from the fact that “its nature is more like a wide-ranging regulatory agreement, with some elements 
of classical trade agreements as well” (Pelkmans et al., 2013:1). On this same issue, see also Richter 
and Schäffer (2014).
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TABLE 1. ASSUMPTIONS AND IMPACT OF TTIP AGREEMENT
Berden et al. 
(2009)*
Fontagné et al. 
(2013)
Francois et al. 
(2013)
Felbermayr et al. 
(2013a)
Basic Assumptions
Forecast period 2008-2018 2015-2025 2017-2027 10-20 years
No. of Scenarios 7 5 5 3
Tariffs reduction
100 % of goods 
75 % of services
100 % 98 - 100 % 100 %
NTM reduction in 
reference scenario 25 % 25 % 25 %
Reduction corres-
ponding to trade 
creation effect
Main Findings
(different scenarios, percentage changes compared to baseline scenario within forecasting period)
EU GDP 0.32 - 0.72 0.0 - 0.5 0.02 - 0.48 0.52 - 1.31++
US GDP 0.13 - 0.28 0.0 - 0.5 0.01 - 0.39 0.35 - 4.82++
EU bilateral exports not speciﬁed 49.0+ 0.69 - 28.0 5.7 - 68.8++
EU total exports 0.91 - 2.07 7.6+
0.16 - 5.91
(extra-EU only)
not speciﬁed
EU real wages 0.34 - 0.78 N/A 0.29 - 0.51 not speciﬁed
Unemployment rate in 
EU-OECD countries
(average % points)
unchanged (as-
sumption)
unchanged (as-
sumption)
unchanged (as-
sumption)
- 0.42 (deep 
liberalisation)
Notes: (*) Findings for ambitious and limited scenarios only; (+) Reference scenario only; (++) 
Derived from Felbermayr et al. (2013b), aggregated to EU27 level.
Source: Raza et al. (2014)
As with most free trade agreements, the TTIP might also pose some ad-
ditional problems, as its geographic and sectoral distribution is likely to be 
very unequal. According to the BMWT/Ifo report,13 the range of the GDP im-
provement goes from a maximum of 3.22% for the UK to a minimum close to 
0% for France (0.06%) and Austria (0.10%). There are, for instance, countries 
with potential effects higher than the EU average, like Sweden (2.15%), Ireland 
(1.99%) and Spain (1.83%), whereas countries with effects below the average 
can be found, such as Italy (1.10) and Germany (0.99%), among others.14
13 This report, published in German, is referred to here as Felbermayr et al. (2013b).
14 As suggested in the Introduction, all of these numerical values should be taken with due caution. 
Just to give an example, the computation of the GDP change for Sweden performed by Kinnman 
and Hagberg (2012) for the Kommerskollegium (National Board of Trade) gives a much lower impact 
than that of the BMWT/Ifo report. Kinnman and Hagberg’s study estimates that the increase in GDP 
would be just between 0.1% and 0.2%, this result depending on which scenario (less ambitious, 
more ambitious) is considered with relation to the reduction of non-trade barriers. A likely reason the 
results of both reports differ is that Kinnman and Hagberg’s study “does not include direct foreign 
investments or consider any dynamic effects” (Kinnman and Hagberg, 2012:3).
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By adopting a sectoral perspective, the CEPR report, which obtains simi-
lar conclusions to the ECORYS report, shows that, from the EU point of view, 
the most beneﬁted sectors would be those of Motor Vehicles,15 Water Trans-
port and Insurance, whereas those with the worst results would be Electronic 
Machinery, Metals and Metal Products and Other Transport Equipment. As 
suggested by Raza et al. (2014), these potential sectoral effects will also vary 
greatly from country to country, which, at best, means that they are not very 
informative at the country level.
4. THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE TTIP ON THE EU COUNTRIES: A PRELIMINARY 
ANALYSIS BASED ON TRADE INDICATORS
As mentioned in the previous section, and even though they are subjected to 
much criticism, the computation of general equilibrium models has become the 
standard approach to evaluate the potential impact of the TTIP agreement, both 
at the EU-wide level and for some of the EU countries, such as Germany, Sweden, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.16 When it comes to the assessment 
of the TTIP’s impact, another possibility, less demanding in terms of data, is to 
carry out indirect ways of estimation based on trade indicators.17 
But, before proceeding further, we think it is compulsory to provide a word 
of caution. Although all of these indices are quantitative indicators, they do not 
allow one to obtain any quantitative approximation to the impact of the TTIP, 
either on trade ﬂows, GDP rates of growth, employment evolution, or say, welfare 
changes. They only allow one to reach a qualitative assessment of the TTIP.18
Bearing these considerations in mind, the indicators computed here are 
those typically employed in empirical studies of international trade perfor-
mance at the country level; they are, in essence, related to intraregional trade 
and trade orientation.  
To save space, we compute all our indicators for the average of the period 
2000-2014 and for two sub-periods: the pre-crisis period (2000-2007) and 
the crisis period (2008-2014). All indicators referring to the whole period, as 
well as some dispersion statistics, are shown in Table 2, while those referring to 
sub-periods are reported in the Appendix (Table A.1).
To begin with, it is important to know how much each country trades with the 
rest of the world, that is, how well the country is integrated in world trade. The in-
dicator measuring this is the Trade Openness (TO) index, given by the sum of total 
15 Even being the most positive change for the EU, the total impact would be very small, as it would be 
the result of a 1.5% increase in output times 2.2 (the share of the sector in EU27 output).
16 The corresponding reports are: Felbermayr and Aichele (2014) for Germany, Kinnman and Hagberg 
(2012) for Sweden, Plaisier et al. (2012) for The Netherlands, and CEPR (2013) for the UK.
17 Similar analysis have been carried out, among others, by Cheong (2010) for the ASEAN and NAFTA 
cases, Davis et al. (2009) for the Australia-Indonesia trade and investment agreement, Péridy (2005) for 
the PAN-ARAB free trade area, and Michaely (1996) for trade preferential agreements in Latin America.
18 By borrowing from Michaely (1996), it can be said that these indicators just evaluate the relevance 
and desirability of multilateral trade agreements, such as the TTIP.
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exports and imports of the country to its GDP; obviously, the higher the index, the 
more open the country under study. The expression for the index is as follows: 
   
  (1)
where X and M denote, respectively, exports and imports, and i refers to the 
country. The values of TO for the EU countries are shown in the ﬁrst column 
of Table 2. According to them, three main conclusions can be drawn: 1. The 
degree of openness varies greatly among countries; 2. On average, the de-
gree of openness is quite high; and, 3. Generally speaking, it has increased 
over the crisis period (Table A.1); more speciﬁcally, eleven countries report in-
creases over 10%, with Slovakia standing out on this side (degree of openness 
increased by 42.4%, comparing pre-crisis and crisis periods), while only two 
countries (Ireland and Luxembourg) experienced a decrease of over 10%. Now, 
because the more open a country is, the more prone to gain from regional 
trade agreements it will be, the inference that can be obtained from these re-
sults is that there are countries already showing a very high openness degree 
(Belgium, Slovakia and Hungary to name a selected few) whereas there are 
others (e.g. Greece, Cyprus and United Kingdom) for which, potentially, there is 
much room for increasing the degree of openness. 
Being too general, the previous conclusion has to be somewhat extended 
and qualiﬁed. This is so because the ﬁnal impact of the TTIP will depend, among 
other things, on the relative extent of the total foreign trade that each country 
conducts with the US and on its sectoral composition; therefore, as stated by 
Michaely (1996:11), “the share of trade with a partner is thus an important 
consideration in pre-judging the likelihood of a beneﬁcial agreement”.19 As for 
the extent of this trade, we calculate a very simple Trade Share (TS) index: 
  (2)
where X, M, and i have the aforementioned meanings, and US refers to Unit-
ed States. This index ranges from 0 to 100, and according to Plummer et al. 
(2010), the closer to 100, the higher the weight of US in the total trade and, 
therefore, the higher the positive potential trade impact of the TTIP. Table 2, 
column 2, shows at least two interesting results. First, the importance of the US 
as a trade partner also varies a lot for the EU countries; as can be seen, both 
the ratio between deciles and the coefﬁcient of variation (CV) are even higher 
than with the TO index. Second, as a whole, the index tends to be quite low; 
this result seems to be in contradiction with previous Figure 2, but the reason 
is that now we think intra-EU trade has to be considered in the calculus (if not, 
19 “This is so because a trade-preferential agreement is likely to be more relevant and lead to less 
trade diversion and more trade creation the higher is the share of” imports from the potential partner 
and the exports to it (Michaely, 1996:11).
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the ﬁgures would be much higher). Another important result is that, and al-
though apart from some speciﬁc cases the index has not experienced dramatic 
changes over the sample period (Table A.1), most of the countries (25 out of 
28) have decreased their relative trade with the US. Therefore, the relatively 
low TS index for the EU countries and its decrease over time implies that, to a 
high extent, they do not consider the US as a high potential market, perhaps 
because there are still some important barriers to trade. Although some of 
them will disappear or be lowered as a result of the TTIP agreement, some 
others (mainly the costs associated with distance) will not change very much, 
if any, with the implementation of the agreement. The tentative implication of 
the previous results is that the potential impact of the TTIP on most EU coun-
tries will be rather low, because in general terms the US cannot be considered 
as a natural trading partner for them. 
If we consider the results obtained for the TO and TS indices together, we 
can have a more accurate idea of the likely effects of the TTIP on the EU coun-
tries. By simply multiplying both indices, we conclude (third column of Table 2) 
that, as a general rule, most developed countries will potentially be the more 
beneﬁted ones (these countries are by ranking Ireland, Belgium, Malta, Neth-
erlands, United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden), while some of the less devel-
oped (Greece, Latvia, Romania, Poland and Croatia) will obtain proportionally 
fewer beneﬁts from the TTIP agreement. 
In addition to the two previous indicators, and in order to better assess 
–although still at a very general level– the potential effects of the TTIP on the 
European countries, it can be useful to compute some other trade indicators 
with information at sectoral level. Therefore, all of the remaining indicators 
have been constructed by using data on bilateral trade between each one of 
the EU countries and the US, disaggregated at the STIC 2-digit (Revision 3).
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TABLE 2. TRADE INDICATORS (AVERAGE 2000-2014)
Countries TO TS (TO*TS)/100 TD (X) TD (M) IIT TC (X) TC (M)
FRANCE 44.4 5.8 2.6 6.4 8.8 77.6 65.9 74.8
BELGIUM 169.0 6.0 10.1 13.6 7.3 68.3 64.1 65.3
LUXEMBOURG 92.6 3.4 3.1 18.8 27.0 29.3 53.9 65.1
NETHERLANDS 124.8 5.4 6.8 5.6 5.4 56.8 66.8 66.2
GERMANY 65.1 6.6 4.3 10.7 5.8 59.0 65.5 77.3
ITALY 43.6 5.4 2.3 4.2 5.2 49.7 63.7 68.8
UNITED KINGDOM 40.1 10.7 4.3 6.7 5.4 68.1 74.6 75.1
IRELAND 83.6 17.4 14.5 20.0 9.1 39.9 40.1 73.5
DENMARK 60.2 4.6 2.8 8.3 6.4 44.1 60.2 73.2
GREECE 33.0 3.1 1.0 10.5 11.2 35.9 57.0 63.2
PORTUGAL 54.8 3.0 1.6 8.6 5.4 39.7 66.2 69.0
SPAIN 43.3 3.5 1.5 5.0 5.0 64.3 66.6 70.5
SWEDEN 61.3 6.0 3.7 7.3 6.0 46.9 66.2 74.3
FINLAND 59.3 4.7 2.8 8.4 5.6 42.7 52.3 70.9
AUSTRIA 80.5 3.5 2.8 6.3 9.5 53.4 64.1 74.3
ESTONIA 129.9 2.6 3.3 32.5 5.4 29.9 65.3 70.3
LITHUANIA 117.8 2.3 2.7 33.9 10.4 20.3 64.8 63.1
MALTA 107.9 7.9 8.5 59.2 17.2 44.0 46.1 61.4
LATVIA 86.7 1.2 1.0 6.7 4.9 40.8 55.6 66.9
POLAND 69.3 1.9 1.3 5.6 5.1 69.0 66.7 74.6
CZECH REPUBLIC 126.7 1.9 2.4 5.9 6.3 68.2 67.9 75.8
SLOVAKIA 138.0 1.4 2.0 37.7 5.9 28.8 65.9 71.0
HUGARY 135.5 2.4 3.2 12.1 8.3 62.8 67.4 73.3
SLOVENIA 120.4 1.7 2.1 9.6 10.8 39.4 60.5 69.9
CYPRUS 39.7 2.2 0.9 15.2 5.6 21.4 63.6 61.6
ROMANIA 68.7 1.9 1.3 8.2 5.1 40.3 62.8 72.7
BULGARIA 102.0 1.7 1.7 7.1 5.1 39.2 60.8 63.7
CROATIA 59.1 2.3 1.3 17.0 5.6 48.0 61.8 68.1
Dispersion Statistics
D9 131.6 7.0 7.3 32.9 10.9 68.3 67.0 74.9
D1 42.3 1.7 1.2 5.6 5.1 29.2 53.4 63.1
Ratio D9/D1 3.1 4.0 6.0 5.9 2.1 2.3 1.3 1.2
CV 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1
Note: D1 and D9 denote ﬁrst and last deciles, respectively. CV refers to the coefﬁcient of variation.
Source: Datacomex, Comtrade, WDI and own elaboration
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The ﬁrst one is the Trade Diversiﬁcation (TD) index, computed, in our case, 
as the well-known Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index. The rationale behind the use 
of this indicator is that the more diversiﬁed the exports and imports of an 
economy, the higher the potential impact of the TTIP. The index, computed for 
both exports and imports, is the following:
  (3)
where sij-US is the share of sector j in country i exports (or imports) with the US, 
and N is the number of sectors. The index is bounded between 0 (exports/
imports are fully diversiﬁed) and 100 (exports/imports are fully concentrated 
on just one product). The computation of this index for all European countries 
yields the results shown in the fourth and ﬁfth columns of Table 2. According 
to them, some remarkable conclusions can be obtained. First, it happens once 
again that there are large differences across countries; in this case, the deciles 
ratio and the CV are especially higher regarding exports. Second, the values 
of the index tend to be rather low, which implies that the degree of diversiﬁ-
cation is high; put in another way, the gains from the TTIP could be, at least 
from this perspective, rather important. Third, and although the pattern here 
is less obvious than with the previous indices, it still happens that some of the 
less developed countries (e.g. Lithuania, Slovakia, Estonia and Croatia) will be 
among the less beneﬁted by the trade agreement; the opposite is not true, 
however, for some of the most developed countries (e.g. Belgium and Germa-
ny). Fourth, Table A.1 also shows that, in this case, there have been signiﬁcant 
changes over the two sub-periods; in some cases the degree of diversiﬁcation 
has signiﬁcantly decreased over the crisis (namely, Sweden, Finland and Malta 
among others) whereas in other cases the degree of diversiﬁcation has notably 
increased (such as Spain, Lithuania, Belgium and Poland).
The calculation of the degree of intra-industry trade is also helpful in our 
task, as it provides information about how much trade between our economies 
occurs within the same industry. The rationale behind this index is that the 
higher its value, the more inclined an economy is to sign a free trade agreement 
with another economy (the US, in this case), and this will foster the level of 
intra-industry trade even more. The Intra-industry Trade (IIT) index computed 
here, and adaptation of the famous Grubel and Lloyd index, is given by the 
expression:
 
  (4)
where all variables have the already known meanings. The index is between 0 
and 100, and as in previous cases, the higher its value, the higher the degree 
of intra-industry trade. The results obtained for this index for the bilateral trade 
between each EU country and the US are displayed in the sixth column of Ta-
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ble 2. These results allow us to conclude that disparities across the European 
countries, although signiﬁcant, are not as high as in the rest of indices. On 
average, the degree of intra-industry trade is relatively high; in fact, there are 
ten countries (France clearly standing out) for which the index is above 50. In 
addition, it is also evident that changes between the pre-crisis and crisis sub-
periods have been very large (Table A.1).
Finally, another interesting trade indicator designed to evaluate the rele-
vance of preferential trade agreements is the so-called Trade Complementarity 
(TC) index, which measures the degree of complementarity of the economic 
structures among the areas involved in the analysis.20 To fully evaluate the 
degree of complementarity, this index should be calculated for both exports 
and imports of the reporting country. As for the exports, this index measures 
“to what extent the export proﬁle of the reporter matches, or complements, 
the import proﬁle of the partner” (World Bank, 2013:19). Formally, it is given 
by the expression:
  (5)
where xij is the value of the exports of sector j from reporter country i, and 
xk is country i’s total exports, while partner country k’s (in this case, the US) 
value of the imports of product j is given by mkj, and its total imports value is 
denoted by Mk.
For imports, the index is given by:
  
(6)
where mij is the value of the imports of sector j from reporter country i, and 
Mi is country i’s total imports, while partner country k’s (in this case, the US) 
value of the exports of product j is given by xkj, and its total exports value is 
denoted by Xk.
In both cases, the index ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 being the case of 
perfect negative correlation (the two areas are perfect competitors) and 100 
that of perfect positive correlation between sectoral shares (the two areas are 
ideal trading partners). Therefore, the closer the index to 100, the higher the 
potential gains from a bilateral or regional trade agreement like the TTIP. When 
the TC indices are computed for each one of the EU countries and the US, the 
results (the last two columns of Table 2) show that: 1. Although cross-country 
disparities are still evident, they are much lower than with all of the previous 
indicators; 2. The degree of complementarity is very high for quite a few cases 
20 This index has been widely used in empirical studies on preferential-trade agreements. See, for 
instance, Michaely (1996) and Ng and Yeats (2003).
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(United Kingdom, Czech Republic standing out); anyway, it can also be seen 
that complementarity is higher on the EU national import side than on the 
export one; 3. Regarding the evolution of the TC index over time (Table A.1), 
our ﬁndings reveal that changes have been quite signiﬁcant in several cases; 
for some countries the crisis has remarkably decreased the complementary 
degree of bilateral trade (e.g. Ireland) while for others has increased it (e.g. 
Latvia and Bulgaria), and for some others the effect differs depending on the 
(export and import) side under consideration (e.g. Greece). 
The computation of the trade indicators performed so far gives us an idea 
of what the EU countries could reasonably expect after the implementation of 
the TTIP. Accordingly, it seems that the TTIP is going to be especially beneﬁcial 
to the most developed countries. Although still within the qualitative realm 
mentioned above, we consider that this idea could have a more quantitative 
support by performing a rather simple analysis, made up of three steps. First, 
by using the battery of indices already computed, we calculate a trade com-
posite indicator as the average of the following partial indicators (Table 3): 1. 
The product of the TO and TS indices, duly normalised;21 2. The average of the 
TD(X) and TD(M) indices;22 3. The ITT index; 4. The average of the TC(X) and 
TC(M) indices. Second, we collect per capita GDP data for all of the EU coun-
tries from the World Development Indicators databank (World Bank) and use 
them as a proxy for the level of development of the countries (see also Table 3). 
Finally, we calculate the correlation coefﬁcient between the composite indica-
tor and per capita GDP. The result obtained reveals that there is a positive and 
statistically signiﬁcant (at 95% level) correlation between our trade composite 
indicator and the degree of development (the correlation coefﬁcient is 0.33).23 
This result somewhat reinforces our previous statement: The TTIP agreement 
is, probably, going to widen cross-country disparities in the EU. At the very 
least, it will not contribute to reduce these differences, as the composite indi-
cator’s ranking is mainly led by rich countries (Ireland, Belgium, UK, Nether-
lands, France, Germany and so forth), while the last positions are mostly held 
by relatively poor countries (e.g. Latvia, Bulgaria and Romania); in fact, if you 
calculate the Spearman’s rank correlation coefﬁcient the ﬁgure rises to 0.47.
21 This index has been normalised in order to prevent it from having an inappropriate weight in the 
composite indicator.
22 In this case, as well as in the TC case, we have calculated an average in order to avoid double 
counting.
23 If we exclude Luxembourg, because it can be consider as an outlier (it is almost twice richer than 
the next country), the correlation coefﬁcient turns out to be 0.48. In addition, and for the sake of 
robustness, we also ran a regression between per capita GDP and our composite indicator, both 
by using parametric and non-parametric techniques, and the ﬁndings revealed, too, a positive 
relationship between these variables.
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TABLE 3. TRADE INDICATORS AND PER CAPITA GDP (AVERAGE 2000-2014)
Countries
TO*TS
Normalised
Mean
TD
IIT
Mean
TC
Trade 
Composite 
Indicator*
Per capita 
GDP+
FRANCE 12.5 7.6 77.6 70.4 42.0 34970
BELGIUM 67.6 10.5 68.3 64.7 52.8 37048
LUXEMBOURG 16.2 22.9 29.3 59.5 32.0 80084
NETHERLANDS 43.4 5.5 56.8 66.5 43.1 42394
GERMANY 25.0 8.3 59.0 71.4 40.9 36447
ITALY 10.3 4.7 49.7 66.2 32.7 31122
UNITED KINGDOM 25.0 6.1 68.1 74.9 43.5 39385
IRELAND 100.0 14.6 39.9 56.8 52.8 49131
DENMARK 14.0 7.4 44.1 66.7 33.1 47974
GREECE 0.7 10.9 35.9 60.1 26.9 21052
PORTUGAL 5.1 7.0 39.7 67.6 29.9 18749
SPAIN 4.4 5.0 64.3 68.5 35.6 25910
SWEDEN 20.6 6.7 46.9 70.2 36.1 43284
FINLAND 14.0 7.0 42.7 61.6 31.3 38794
AUSTRIA 14.0 7.9 53.4 69.2 36.1 39152
ESTONIA 17.6 19.0 29.9 67.8 33.6 10314
LITHUANIA 13.2 22.2 20.3 63.9 29.9 8394
MALTA 55.9 38.2 44.0 53.8 48.0 15450
LATVIA 0.7 5.8 40.8 61.2 27.1 7712
POLAND 2.9 5.4 69.0 70.7 37.0 8941
CZECH REPUBLIC 11.0 6.1 68.2 71.8 39.3 13605
SLOVAKIA 8.1 21.8 28.8 68.5 31.8 12845
HUGARY 16.9 10.2 62.8 70.3 40.1 10877
SLOVENIA 8.8 10.2 39.4 65.2 30.9 18325
CYPRUS 0.0 10.4 21.4 62.6 23.6 23986
ROMANIA 2.9 6.7 40.3 67.7 29.4 5068
BULGARIA 5.9 6.1 39.2 62.3 28.4 4136
CROATIA 2.9 11.3 48.0 65.0 31.8 10161
Note: (*) Trade Composite Indicator is calculated as the simple average of the ﬁrst four columns; (+) 
In constant dolars.
Source: Datacomex, Comtrade, WDI and own elaboration.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The negotiations of a free trade agreement between the EU and the US, 
the so-called TTIP, have prompted a heated debate about its impact on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Although much praised at the highest ofﬁcial levels for 
its expected positive effects on both economies, there is an ongoing debate 
about not only their magnitude, but also their distribution. After revising some 
of the most relevant reports on the issue, our conclusion is that, at least from 
the European side, the global impact of the TTIP seems to be rather limited, 
but positive, as well as unevenly distributed among sectors. 
However, neither the reports assessing the TTIP for the whole EU nor those 
devoted to the same analysis at the country level pay any attention to the po-
tential impact of the TTIP for each single EU country.24 This is, indeed, a serious 
limitation of these reports, as it is highly likely that this impact will vary greatly 
across them. This paper constitutes a preliminary attempt to ex-ante assess, 
admittedly at a very general qualitative level and just paying attention to the 
trade side of it, the impact of the TTIP agreement at country level. 
In our view, two main conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, the ex-
tent and composition of the bilateral trade between each one of the EU coun-
tries and the US varies substantially; accordingly, the impact of the TTIP (both 
on the extent and the composition of their foreign trade with the US) will differ 
by country. Secondly, the most developed countries tend to be those that, 
potentially, will undergo a higher increase in their trade with the US. Taking 
these two conclusions together, and assuming a positive relationship between 
trade openness and economic growth, a third conclusion emerges: There is 
high likelihood that the TTIP will provoke an increase in cross-country dispari-
ties in Europe. 
Whether this negative effect will be more than offset by the expected posi-
tive effect of the TTIP at the EU-wide level or by other effects25 is unknown. In 
any case, the conventional trade-off between efﬁciency (EU-wide GDP growth) 
and equity (distribution of GDP growth) is, once again, at stake. Therefore, 
and to prevent the expected increase on cross-country disparities, we think 
that policy strategies carried out at different scales should go, hand in hand, 
with the implementation of the TTIP. In fact, the TTIP –along with the negative 
effects of the recent economic crisis- could be a good excuse to strengthen 
cohesion policy in the EU. In which direction? Although there is a great debate 
about this, we think that a combination of actions addressed to both reinforce 
public capital in the less developed EU countries and provide direct help to the 
investment initiatives of their private business would be the best option. 
24 It is convenient to note that the BMWT/Ifo report (Felbermayr et al., 2013b) also makes an analysis 
at country level, but only for a sample of countries.
25 We are mainly thinking about the effects related to the “investment” side of the agreement.
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